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defendant's land, who covenanted not to use the water on his land
unnecessarily, so as to interfere with the plaintiff's right of use of
the water. Defendant unnecessarily made excavations on his lanri,
which diminished the flow of water. Held, that the excavations,
though not interfering with any known watercourse, but drawing
the water off by percolation, were yet unlawful, as defendant was by
his grant precluded from stopping or in any way lessening the supply of water.
ARTHUR BIDDLE.
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User which is neither physically preventible by the owner of the servient tenement,
nor actionable, cannot found an easement.
A confectioner had for more than twenty years used large mortars in his back
kitchen, which abutted on the garden of a physician. Subsequently, the physician
erected in his garden a consulting room, one of the side walls of which was the
party wall between the confectioner's kitchen and the garden. The noise and vibration caused by the use of the mortars, which had previously caused no material
annoyance to the physician, then became a nuisance to him, and he brought an action
for an injunction: Held, that the defendant had not acquired an easement, and that
the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.

APPEAL from the Master of the Rolls. Action to restrain analleged nuisance.
The plaintiff was a physician, who occupied as his professional
residence the house No. 85 Wimpole street, the lease of which he
purchased in 1865. Wimpole street is crossed at right angles by
Wigmore street, and the plaintiff's house, wvhich was the second
house from the corner where Wigmore street crosses, had at its
rear a garden, at the end of which the plaintiff erected a consultingroom in 1873.
The defendant was a confectioner, who carried on business at
30 Wigmore street, and his kitchen was at the back of his house,
having been erected on ground which was formerly a garden, and
which abutted on the portion of the plaintiff.'s garden on which he
built the consulting-room. Thus one of the side walls of the
consulting-room was the back wall of the defendant's kitchen.
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The defendant had in his kitchen two large marble mortars, set in
brickwork, built up to and against the party-wall, which separated
his kitchen from the plaintiff's consulting-room, and worked by
two large wooden pestles, held in an upright position by horizontal
bearers, fixed into the party-wall. These mortars were used for
breaking up and pounding loaf sugar, and other hard substances,
and for pounding meat.
The plaintiff alleged that when the defendant's pestles and
mo:tars were being used-and they were generally used between
10 A. m. and 1 P. .- the noise and vibration caused thereby was
very great, and were heard and felt in the plaintiff's consultingroom, and that such noise and vibration seriously annoyed and
disturbed the plaintiff, and materially interfered with him in the
practice of his profession; and that in particular the noise prevented
him from examining his patients by auscultation for diseases of the
chest, and that he also found it impossible to engage with effect in
any occupation which required thought and attefition.
In his statement of defence the defendant alleged that he and
his father had used one of the pestles and mortars in the same
place and to the same extent as now for more than sixty years,
and that he had used the other pestle and mortar in the same
place and to the same extent as now for more than twenty-six
years; that if the plaintiff had built his consulting-room with a
separate wall, and not against the wall of the defendant's kitchen,
he would not have experienced any noise or vibration; and he
denied that the plaintiff suffered any serious annoyance, and he
pleaded a prescriptive right to use the pestles and mortars under
the 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 71.
The Master of the Rolls granted an injunction, and from this
decision the defendant appealed.
Chitty, Q. C., and lJlethold, f6r appellant.-A right is acquired
by twenty years' user in cases of easements analogous to the present:
Baxendale v. Hfeurray, Law Rep., 2 Oh. 790; Crump v. -Lambert, Law Rep., 3 Eq. 409; Ball v. Bay, Law Rep., 8 Ch. 467;
Gale on Easements, 4th ed., p. 20; _Elliotson v. -eetham, 2
Bing. N. 0. 134; Bliss v. Hall, 4 Id. 183; lght v. Thomas,
10 A. & E. 590; 8 C1. & Fin. 331; Wright v. Williams, 1
M. & W. 77 ; Gaunt v. -ynney, Law Rep.. 8 Ch. 8 ; St. Hfelen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. of L. Cas. 642; Angus v..Dalton,
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Law Rep., 3 Q. B. Div. 85; 4 Q. B. Div. 162; Partridgev. Scott,
3 M. & W. 220.
Waller, Q. C., and S. Dickn8on, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
THESIGER, L. J.-It has been proved that in the use of the
mortars before and at the time of action brought, a noise was caused
which seriously inconvenienced the plaintiff in the use of his consulting-room, and which, unless the defendant had acquired a right
to impose the inconvenience, would constitute an actionable nuisance. The defendant contends that he had acquired the right
either at common law or under the Prescription Act by uninterrupted
use for more than twenty years. In deciding this question one more
fact is necessary to be stated. Prior to the erection of the consulting-room no material annoyance or inconvenience was caused to the
plaintiff or to any previous occupier of the plaintiff's house by what
the defendant did. It is true that the defendant in the seventh
paragraph of his affidavit speaks of an invalid lady who occupied
the house upon one occasion about thirty years before requesting
him, if possible, to discontinue the use of his mortars before eight
o'clock in the morning, and it is true also that there was some
evidence of the garden wall having been subjected to vibration;
but this vibration, even if it existed at all, was so slight, and the
complaint, if it can be called a complaint, of the invalid lady, and
can be looked upon as evidence, was of such a trifling character, that
upon the maxim de minimis non curat lex, we arrive at the conclusion that the defendant's acts would not have given rise to any
proceedings either at law or in equity. Here, then, arises the
objection to the acquisition by the defendant of any easement.
That which was done by him was in its nature such that it could
not be physically interrupted; it could not, at the same time, be
put a stop to by action. Can user, which is neither preventable
nor actionable, found an easement? We think not. The question,
so far as regards this particular easement claimed, is the same
question, whether the defendant endeavors to assert his right by
common law or under the Prescription Act. That act fixes periods
for the acquisition of easements; but except in regard to the particular easement of light, or in regard to certain matters which are
immaterial to the present inquiry, it does not alter the character of
easements or of the user or enjoyment by which they are acquired
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This being so, the law governing the acquisition of easements by
user stands thus: Consent or acquiescence of the owner of the
servient tenement lies at the root of prescription and of the fiction
of a lost grant, and hence the acts or user which go to the proof
of either the one or the other must be, in the language of the civil
law, nee vi, nee clam, nee precario; for a man cannot, as a general
rule, be said to consent to or acquiesce in the acquisition by his
neighbor of an easement through an enjoyment of which he has no
knowledge, actual or constructive, or which he contests and endeavors to interrupt, or which he temporarily licenses. It is a mere
extension of the same notion, or rather it is a principle into which
by strict analysis it may be resolved, to hold that an enjoyment
which a man cannot prevent, can raise no presumption of consent
or acquiescence. Upon this principle it was decided in Tebb v.
Bird, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 841, that currents of air blowing from a
particular quarter of the compass; and in Ohasemore v. Bichards,
T H. of L. Cas. 349, that subterranean water percolating the
strata in no known channels could not be acquired as an easement
by user; and in Angus v. Dalton, Law Rep. 4 Q. B. Div. 162,
17 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 645; a case of lateral support of buildings
by adjacent soil, which came on appeal to this court, the principle
was in no way impugned, although it was held by the majority of
the court not to be applicable so as to prevent the acquisition of
that particular easement. It is a principle which must be equally
appropriate to the case of affirmative as of negative easements; in
other words, it is equally unreasonable to imply consent to your
neighbor enjoying something which passes from your tenement to
his, or subjecting your tenement to something which comes from
his, when in both cases you have no power of prevention. But
the affirmative easement differs from the negative easement in this ;
that the latter can in no circumstances be interrupted other than
by acts done upon the servient tenement; the former constituting
as it does a direct interference with the enjoyment by the servient
owner of his tenement, may be the subject of legal proceedings as
well as of physical interruption. To put concrete cases, the passage of light and air to your neighbor's window may be physically
interrupted by you, but gives you no legal ground of complaint
against him. The passage of water from his land on to yours may
be physically interrupted, or may be treated as a trespass and
made the ground of action for damages, or for an injunction, or
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both. Noise, then, is similar to currents of air and the flow of
subterranean and uncertain streams in its practical incapability of
physical interruption, but it differs from them in its capability of
grounding an action: Webb v. Bird, and Cha8emore v. Richards
are not, therefore, direct authorities governing the present case.
They are, however, illustrations of the principle which ought to
govern .it, for until the noise, to take the present case, became an
actionable nuisance, which it did not at any time before the consulting-room was built, the basis of the presumption of consent, viz.,
the power of prevention physically or by action-was never present.
It is said that if this principle is applied in cases like the present,
,and were carried out to its logical consequences, it would result in
the most serious practical inconveniences, for a man might go, say,
into the midst of the tanneries of Bermondsey, or into any other
locality devoted to a particular trade or manufacture of a noisy or
unsavory character, and by building a private residence upon a
vacant piece of land put a stop to such trade or manufacture altogether. The case also is put of a blacksmith's forge, built away
from all habitations, but to which in time habitations approach.
We do not think that either of these hypothetical cases presents
any real practical difficulty. As regards the first, it may be
answered that whether anything is a nuisance or not is a question
to be determined, not merely by an abstract consideration of the
thing itself, but in reference to its circumstances.
What would
be a nuisance in Belgrave square would not necessarily be so in
Bermondsey; and where a locality is devoted to a particular trade
or manufacture carried on by the traders or manufacturers in a
particular and established manner not constituting a public nuisance,
judges and juries would be justified in finding and may be trusted
to find, that the trade or manufacture so carried on in that locality
is not a private or actionable wrong. As regards the blacksmith's
forge, that is really an idem per idem case with the present. It
would be, on the one hand, in a very high degree unreasonable
and undesirable that there should be a right of action for acts
which are not in the present condition of the adjoining land, and
possibly never will be, any annoyance or inconvenience to either
its owner or occupier; it would be, on the other hand, in an equal
degree unjust, and from a public point of view, inexpedient that
the use and value of the adjoining land should for all time and
under any circumstances be restricted and diminished by reason of
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the continuance of acts incapable of physical interruption, and
which the law gives no power to prevent. The smith in the case
supposed might protect himself by taking a sufficient curtilage to
insure what he does from being at any time an annoyance to his
neighbor, but the neighbor himself would be powerless in the
matter. Individual cases of hardship may, no doubt, occur in the
strict carrying out of the principle upon which we found our judgment, but the negation of the principle would lead even more to
individual hardship, and would at the same time produce a prejudicial effect upon the development of land for residential purposes.
The Master of the Rolls in the court below took substantially the
same view as ourselves, and granted the relief prayed for; and we
are of opinion his order was right and should be affirmed.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Nothing is mcse elementary than this :
That in order to gain an easement by
prescription, it is absolutely essential that
the enjoyment should have been "adverse" ; but it is not always so apparent
that in order to be adverse, within the
meaning of that word, the use must have
been one wE(' J istified and was capable of immediate prevention by some action, either at law, or in pais, or both,
of the othei party. The claimant of the
easement .anzot acquire a legal right,
unless all the time he is committing a
legal wrong; he is not committing a legal
wrong unless he is all the time subject to
some legal redress. He must be constantly stea:ing away the original legal
rights of the opposite party, and constantly transferring them to himself, and
if the other knows of this steady loss of
his right and takes no means to prevent
it when A can, then after the. requisite
time he has lost it altogether.
Thus the prior occupation and use of a
mill-stream in a reasonable manner and
extent, for ay lngth of time, cannot give
the mill-owner any prescriptive right to
the exclusive use of the water, as against
an upper propr:etor, who subsequently
erects his mill and dam above, and thus
in some degree impedes the water, and
interferes with the former free and unimVoL. XXVII---45

peded use of the same. Why? Because
the upper proprietor could not have had
any action during the time for such reasonable use of the water by the proprietor below: Thurber v. Martin, 2 Gray
394; Parker v. Hotchkiss, 25 Conn.
321 ; Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 13
Gray 442; Hoyt v. Sterrett, 2 Watts
327; and see Plait v. Johnson, 15
Johns. 213; Keenej a,.d Wood Man'f.
Co. v. Union Man'f. Co., 39 Conn..576;
Heath v. William,, 25 Me. 209 ; Dumont
v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420.
But if an upper riparian proprietor
unreasonablydiverts o ruses the water of
a natural surface stream, a right of action therefor instantly accrues to every
lower proprietor, even though he has no
present use for the water, either for meehaical, agricultural or domestic purposes, and consequently has sustained no
actual perceptible damage: Xtwhall v.
Ireson, 8 Cush. 595, and other cases.
And because he has an immediate right
of action for at least nominal damages,
this unreasonable use of the water becomes immediately adverse, and consequently, if enjoyed for a period of twenty
years, it becomes a perfect prescriptive
right. It does not require twenty years
enjoyment from the time of actual damage to the lower proprietor, but only from
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the time the unureasonable use originated.
The power to commence an action is the
test of the commencement of the adverse
right.
Whereas, in underground water, percolating through the soil and not collected
in any stream, or volume, no length of
enjoyment can ever give a person an adverse right against another, simply because the latter never had a right of
action against the person so using it, or
benefited by it, and so no prescriptive
right ever commenced ; consequently,
although a mill-owner for more than sixty
years enjoys the use of a stream of water,
which is chiefly supplied by such underground percolating water, he acquires no
prescriptive right to such continued underground supply, and can maintain no
action against an adjoining landowner,
who by digging for an extensive well on
his own land, cuts off all such underground supply. The inability of the
landowner to sue for using it is conclusive
against the acquisition of any right by
using it. Such was the well-known case
of Chasenaore v. Richards, 7 H. L. C.
49 (1859) ; 5 H. & N. (Am. ed.) 982 ;
2 Id. 168. And Vheatley v. Baugh, 25
Penn. St. 528, is very similar.
The easement of lateral support for
one's land furnishes another illustration.
Every one has a natural and original
right of supporting his land by the adjoining land of his neighbor, this being
naturally limited to support of his laud
in its natural state, without any buildings,
or other artificial improvements, or
weights placed upon it. He may acquire,
however, by express grant, an additional
right or easement for the support of buildings as well as land; but he cannot do
that by prescription. Why? Because
having a legal right to erect buildings on
his land, he does not thereby render himself liable to any action by his neighbor,
and his neighbor has no right or power
to prevent it. Enjqyment, therefore, for
any length of time cannot destroy or create any rights. This result, apparently

so obvious and simple, we bad reached
in this country long before it was announced in England, by CocKnU,
C. J., in Angus v. Dalton, and even
while the English courts were constantly
deciding the very opposite. For as early
as 1838, the Supreme Court of Peunsylvania, in Riclart v. Scott, 7 Watts 462,
in speaking of this subject declared, "It
is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive
how an implication or presumption of
such license orgrantcan be made, where
there is no adverse user, encroachment
upon or possession had or taken of any
rights or thing belonging to another, and
nothing done to which any other can make
even the slightest color of objection."
And Georgia still more emphatically
declared in Mitchell v. Mayor, 49 Ga.
19 (1873), that "it is difficult, if not
impossible, to see how this doctrine (of
prescription) can be made to apply to
those instances of easements, so called,
when there is no possession of anything
belonging to another, no encroachment
upon another's rights, no adverse user:
in fact nothing done whatever against
which another could complain, or for
which an action could be brought; and
no remedy existing whereby to prevent
such a presumption from arising."
Wlfile in Massachusetts, C. J. GnAx,
in Gilmore v. Driscoll, 122 Mass. 207,
in 1877, is reported to have said: "It is
difficult to see how the owner of a house
can acquire by prescription a right to
have it supported by the adjoining lan',
inasmuch as he does nothing upon, and
has no use of, that land, which can be
seen, or known, or interrupted, or sued
for, by the owner thereof, and therefore
no assent of the latter can be presumed
to the acquiremeuts of any rights in his
land by the former."
The alleged prescriptive right to flow
of air furnishes another example of the
same principle. Thus if one erects a
windmill on his own land, and maintains
the same over twenty years, and enjoys,
all that time, a current of air across the
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land of adjoining proprietors, he does
not, ane zannot thereby acquire a prescriptive right to a continuance of such
flow, or prevent adjoining proprietors
from erecting buildings or other structures on their land, which shall entirely
intercept the inds and currents of air to
his mill. Why? Because during the
twenty years he has done nothing of
which adjoining owners can legally complain. They can bring no action; they
cannot abate his mill, and so he cannot
be acquiring any adverse rights to them
in the winds or air currents. This was
distinctly settled in lVebb v. Bird, 10 C.
B. (N. S.) 268, in the Exchequer Chainher, 13 Id. 841.
In like manner, in a still more recent
ease, A. had enjoyed for more than
twenty years, a free current of air to his
chimneys over the adjoining lower building of B., who after that period raised
his building another story, and piled timber upon it, by which the passage of air
lo A.'s chimneys was cut off, and they
,.onsequently smoked and became useless.
In an action by A. against B. for such
abstraction it was held that A. could not
acquire any right by prescription against
B., for it was not "adverse."
And
BRA31WELL, B., added : "It
may be
said the reasoning by which this conclusion is reached, if correct, is applicable

to lights ; so it is to a great extent, and
any one who reads the cases relating to

an acquisition of a right to light, will see
there has been great difficulty in establish.
ing it on principle :" Brgant v. LJever,
4 Law Rep. C. P. D. 172 (1879).
It seems singular how the English
courts, in the light of these analogies,
ever established the doctrine that a right
to light could ever be acquired over the
land of another by prescription or long
enjoyment. How generally such a notion is repudiated by the American courts
was shown in a note to Stein v. Hauck,
17 Am. Law Reg. 440. And since that
note was published the Supreme Court
of Kentucky has pronounced its judgment in favor of what may be called the
American doctrine: Ray v. Sireeney, 14
Bush 1. And see Iayden v. Dutcher,
31 N. J. Eq. 217 ; Guest v. Reynalds,
68 11. 478.
The Queen's Bench of Ontario also,
in a well-considered case, evidently ap
proves the American and not the Eng
lish view on this point. See Hall v
Evans, 42 Up. Can. Q. B. 190.
And the English judges have not hesi
tated, in recent cases, to declare the doctrine anomolous, difficult to sustain, anJ
not to be extended.
ED3UND I. BENNETT.

District Court of California; Fourth -District.
ROSENBERG

ET AL. v.

FRANK

ET AL.

The phrase pro rata means ordinarily " according to a certain rate or proportion ,"
and is presumed to be used in that sense in a will, unless a contrary intent of the
testator clearly appears.
A testator having left speifie sums differing in amount to certain relatives, directed that the residue of his estate should be divided pro rata among the same relaives, naming them; Held, that the phrase pro rata must be construed as meaning
according to the rate already established by the testator, in the specific legacies to
the same persons.
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THIS was a bill in equity, to obtain a judicial construction of the
last will and testament of Michael Reese. The testator had three
sisters of the full-blood surviving him, two sisters of the half-blood,
and three nieces, the issue of a deceased sister of the full-blood.
By his will he gave to each of his sisters $100,000; to each of his
half-sisters, $50,000, and to each of his nieces $50,000, or $150,000
to the three. The will then declared that if there should be anything left after paying the specific legacies set forth in the will,
nnd his debts, "the balance shall be dividedpro rata," among his
sisters, his half-sisters, and his nieces, naming them all.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MORnISON, J.-The difficulty which gives rise to this controversy is as to the true construction of the words "Pro rata."
Three constructions are contended for-one that the residue should
be distributed pro rata; another that it should be distributed
according to the law of distribution and descent; and another,
that it should be distributed per capita, or equally. Now, in the
first place, it is contended that pro rata means "according to
rate," according to a rate established by the testator, and that
according to that rate the sisters of the full-blood take twice as
much as the sisters of the half-blood, and twice-as much as each of
the nieces; because he has given to each of the sisters of the fullblood twice as much as he has given to each of the sisters of the
half-blood and the nieces. Another construction claimed is that
the words pro rata mean "according to law," and "according to
law" means according to the Statutes of Distribution and Descents.
Under that construction of the will, the sisters of the full-blood
and the sisters of the half-blood would share equally, and the nieces
would represent their ancestor.
Another view contended for is that the term pro rata means
"equally," and that therefore each of the devisees named in the
residuary clauses of the will take equally, share and share alike.
It devolves upon the court to construe the term pro rata. It is a
cardinal principle in the construction of wills that the intention of
the testator shall be carried out, if it can be gathered from the
language employed by the testator.
Redfield says: "All the books which treat of the construction
of wills constantly repeat the formula, that the intention of the
testator is the prevailing consideration in applying all rules of
construction. And Jarman says, in his rules of construction,
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"Tha words in general are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another
can be collected. That where a testator uses technical words, he
is presumed to employ them in their legal sense." And we have in our code substantially the same rules of construction that are laid down by these writers on wills.
See. 1317 of the Civil Code, provides, that "a will is to be
construed according to the intention of the testator. Where his
intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have effect as
far as possible."
Sec. 1318. In case of uncertainty arising upon the face of a
will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking
into view the circumstances under which it was made, exclusive of
his oral declarations.
See. 1821. All the parts of a will are to be construed in relation
to each other, so as, if possible, to form one consistent whole; but
where several parts are absolutely irreconcilable, the latter must
prevail.
See. 1323. Where the meaning of any part of a will is ambiguous or doubtful, it may be explained by any reference thereto. "or
recital thereof in another part of the will."
See. 1324. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in
another sense can be ascertained.
See. 1325. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative.
See. 1327. Technical words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention.
A great deal has been said about the distribution of estates per
capita,and the distribution of estates per stirpes; and, perhaps, all
of the decisions bearing upon the question of whether the distribution shall be made per capita, by the head, or per stirpes, by the
stock or right of representation, from the case of Blackler v. Mebb,
2 Peere Wins. 383, down to the present day, have been commented
upon by the learned counsel who have argued this case.
It is claimed by the learned counsel representing the nieces, that
where persons are named in a will they take per capita; that is,

ROSENBERG v. FRANK.

in their own right; but where they are designated as "heirs,"
they take per stihpes, representing their ancestor. And I have no
doubt that these devisees, the half-sisters and the nieces, all of
whom are named, would take per capita under this will, if it were
not for any word or words controlling the general rule of law applicable to the distribution of estates under wills.
But here the testator has given to each of his full sisters
$100,000, to each of his half-sisters $50,000, and to each of his
-nieces $50,000; and he makes various bequests; $60,000 to be
divided between two nephews and others, the smallest being $2500.
He has disposed in this manner of $1,080,000 of his property, and
there remains $6,000,000 to be disposed of; and he says this is to
be divided pro rata among his full sisters, his half-sisters, and his
nieces, naming them all. Now, what did he mean when he said
"1prorata ?" Did he mean "according to law," or "according to
rule," as is contended for by counsel who represent the half-sisters .Y
Did he mean "equally, share and share alike," as is contended
for on behalf of the counsel who represent the nieces? Or did he
mean "according to a certain rate," or " proportion established by
him in a former clause of the will ?" This is the question which
the court has to determine: "What is the meaning of the term pro
rata ?" It means "rateably, proportionably, proportionately."
These are some of the definitions given by lexicographers and in
law dictionaries, "rateably, proportionably, proportionately, according to a certain proportion."
The meaning of the adverbial phrase (as it is called) "pro rata"
It is a term which is in very common use among
is well known.
business men; one which occurs very frequently in the reports, in
the statutes of the United States, and in the statutes of the state
of California. For instance, it is used in the Insolvent Law of this
state of 1852; also in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1648,
in reference to the payment of creditors of the estate of deceased
persons. It is used in the United States Bankrupt Law; and in
Abbott on Shipping as "an apportionment pro rata itineris."
So in general average for jettison of goods; all property saved
contributes pro rata: Abbott on Shipping 502.
In the Civil Code, section 2151, the words "in due proportion"
sre used as meaning the same as "pro rata." In Orton v. Orton,
3 Abbott's Decisions 416, the court speaks of a pro rata reduction of legacies. Section 1313, of the Civil Code, uses the terms
"in proportion, or in accordance with a certain rate."
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In Thompson on the Liability of Stockholders, sections 18, 53
and 69, it is used in the same sense.
In Prince v. Lynch, 38 Cal. 534, it is used in the same sense:
"accordinor to rate."
In Parkerv. Page, 38 Cal. 524, it has the same signification,
and in cases too numerous to mention, the term pro rata is used,
and always signifies, the same thing: "according to a certain
rate," or "according to a certain proportion, proportionately, proportionably." But in no case that I have seen or been referred to,
does the term pro rata signify "equally," or "share and share
alike."
It is proved in this case that Mr. Reese was a very shrewd business man, unusually so; and it is also in evidence that he was interested in a large estate, the Sime estate, in which there was a
distribution of the assets pro rata, according to the claims of the
different creditors.
In my opinion the term pro rata has a well-known signification
among business men; and that it has a well-known legal meaning
cannot be doubted. It is used in the statutes, in adjudged cases,
in text books, and it is used invariably as signifying "according to
a certain rate or proportion," and never as signifying equality.
Now the testator in this case gave to each of his full sisters
twice as much as he gave to each of his half-sisters and his nieces.
It seems to me that that was a very reasonable disposition for him
to make of his property. And, when he came to the residuary
clause, he directed that whatever was left after the payment of
these specific legacies and his debts, should be distributed pro rata,
according to rate already established by himself in his will. I am,
therefore, of opinion that each of the sisters of the full blood take
twice as much of the residue of the estate as each of the sisters of
the half-blood, and twice as much as each of the nieces; that the
half-sisters and the nieces take equally; that the full sisters take
in the proportion already established in a prior clause in the will,
that is to say, twice as much-two shares to one.
The residuary clause of the testator's

Weineman, Lena Coin and the children

will in the principal case was in the followi-g words: " If there is any surplus
after paying my legacicu and debts, the

of Mary Fuller, deceased, namely, Hana
Goldsmith, Carry Mlonheimer and Rosa
Fuller."

balance to be divided pro rata between

By the first bequest in his willl, the

my sisters, Eliese Frank, Henrietta Ro-

testator had given $100,000 each to
Eiese Frank, Henrietta Rosenfield and

sanfeld, Hana Rosenberg and Theresa
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Hana Rosenberg, who in fact were his
sisters of the whole blood, and $50,000
each to Theresa Weinman and Lena
Cohn, who were sisters of the half blood,
and $150,000 in gross to Jacob Rosenberg, in trust for Hana Goldsmith, Carry
Monheimer and Rosa Fuller, who were,
in fact, his nieces. And then, after seventeen more independent bequests, comes
the residuary clause.
Three questions arose upon the construction of the residuary clause :
1. Did the testator mean by using the
term pro rata, that the surplus should be
divided in the same proportion that the
first bequests were made to the residuary
legatees? or,
2. Did he mean it should be distributed per capita, which would be equally ?
or,
3. Did he mean that it should be distributed among them according to the law
of descent ?
By the first construction, the surplus
would be divided into eleven shares, of
which the three sisters of the whole blood
would get six shares, and the two sisters
of the half-blood, and the three nieces
would each get one share of the remaining five.
By the second mode of distribution the
surplus would be divided into eight
shares, of which each would get one.
By the third mode, the estate would
be divided into six shares, of which the
sisters and half-sisters would get five,
and the nieces, collectively, the remaining share.
The language of the residuary clause
of this will is peculiar; but the real intention of the testator must be determined
by interpreting the language he has used
according to the settled canons of construction.
The question in expounding a will is
not what the testator meant, but what is
the meaning of his words: 2 Williams
ou Executors 1148; MAfrtindale v. Wrver, 15 Penn. St. 471.
It is the intention of the testator, man-

ifested in his words, which makes it his
last will and testament: Quincy v. Ro 9 ers, 9 Cush. 295 ; Bailey v. Bailey, 25
Mich. 188; Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 75;
Spooner v. Lovejoy, 108 Mass. 533;
Shore v. Wilson, 9 Cl. & Fin. 525.
So, in construing wills, the courts take
notice of the natural relations in which
the testator stands to the objects of his
bounty, and of the mode in which the
law would dispose of the estate in case
he had died without indicating his purposes; and thus they will interpret 'the
will by these considerations and legal
dispositions, unless such interpretation
should be overcome by extrinsic facts
clearly existing, and obvious to the mind
of the testator, or by the explicit and unmistakable terms of the will: Clark v.
Lynch, 46 Barb. 81; Risk's Appeal, 52
Penn. St. 269.
In looking at this will, we see at a
glance that the true construction of the
residuary clause chiefly depends upon the
meaning to be attached to the phrase pro
rata. And there can be scarcely a doubt
but that being a technical phrase it must
be given a technical meaning.
Sect. 1327 of the Civil Code of Cali.
fornia embodies the seventeeth rule of
Mr. Jarman and enacts that "technical
words in a will are to be taken in their
technical sense unless the context clearly
indicates a contrary intention." And
such is the general rule: Phillipsv.Garth,
3 Brown Ch. R. 68 ; Doebler's Appeal,
64 Penn. St. 15; Evcans v. Godbold, 6
Rich. Eq. S. C. 26; Campbell v. Raw.
don, 18 N. Y. 417.
Although this was an autographic will,
nothing appears to exempt it from his
rule.
There are a large number of cases de.
fining when legatees will take per cap
ito; but these can throw but little light
upon the interpretation of this will, for
in all the cases, without exception, ip
which it is held that where a gift is made
to one person standing in a certain rela
tion to the testator, and to thle childrer
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to heirs of another person standing in
the same relation to him, the beneficiaries
take per capita; it will be found that the
words "to be equally divided," or "in
equal shares. ' * or words of similar import, have also been employed in the
will, and have been deemed by the courts
of controlling significance in ascertaining
and determining the intent of the testator: Clark v. Lynch, 46 Barb. 81.
It is clear, as stated in the principal
case, that if the residuary clause were to
be considered entirely distinct from the
other portions of the will, and contained
no technical phrase modifying its meaning, then the residuary legatees would
take per capita, as they are specifically
named: 2 Lomax on Ex'rs 60; Blackter v. Webb, 2 Peere Wins. 383; Lugar v. Harman, I Cox 250; Eceard v.
Brooke, 2 Id. 213 ; Longmore v. Broom,
7 Vesey 128; Hoppock v. Tucker, 59
N. Y. 208; Starling's Ex'rs v. Prce,
16 Ohio St. 29.
But the per capita mode of construction
will yield to a very faint glimpse of a
different intention in the context: 2
Jarman on Wills, 4th Am. ed. 111 ; 2
Lomax on Ex'rs 61 ; Fisherv. Skillman's
Ex'rs, 18 N. J. Eq. 229 ; Balcom v.
17aynws, 14 Allen 204.
W"'here there is any expression in the
will by which it can be perceived that
the testator intended a division by stocks,
that intention should be carried out :
Simith v. Curtis, 5 Dutcher (N. J.) 347.
The courts are bound to give effect to
every word of a will without change or
rejection, provided an effect can be given
to it not inconsistent with the general intent of the whole will taken together:
2 Williams on Ex'rs 1160: Constantine
v. Constantine, 6 Vesey 102 ; Hall v.
Marren, 9 H. L. C. 420 ; Col v. Colt,
32 Conn. 446 ; Chrystie v. Ph.qfe, 19
N. Y. 348; Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N.
I. 500; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc.,
7 Mete. 205.
As the words pro rata cannot be disregarded, what meaning must be attached
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to them ? The full phrase would be either pro rata parte, or pro rata portione,
as the testator may have by it referred
to the persons or property to be divided.
In either case the term means--in proportion : in due proportion: Burrll
Law Die. According to the rate, proportion or allowance: Bouv. Law Die.
It never means, as applied to persons,
equality, or an equal division. And this
would seem to be an unanswerable objection to the theory that the testator
meant by it to divide the residue of his
estate per capita among these legatees.
The term used necessarily implies an
unequal division, as between different persons. It recognises also that the persons
between whom the residue was to be divided had a distinct but unequal right
to, or claim upon his bounty; and hence
out of the whole residue each was to be
allowed a sum in proportion to the standard in the mind of the testator of her
right or desert.
What was that standard? The mcaning of the words, and the settled rules
of construction combined to overthrow
the theory, that the testator contemplated
a per capita, that is, an equal distribution.
But the principal case assumes that the
standard in the mind of the testator must
have been the bequests previously made,
It seems difficult, however, to sustain
that position upon any other ground than
mere conjecture, and this the rules of
construction will not tolerate.
The residuary clause is wholly separated from the specific legacy clause, and
is not related to it in its subject-matter.
It contains, moreover, no reference to it.
To construe it, therefore, as dependent
upon it, or governed by it, would be to
violate the canon of construction which
is concisely expressed in the twenty-second rule of Mr. Jarman: "That several independent devises not grammatically
connected or united by the expression of
a common purpose, must be construed
separately, and without relation to each
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other; although it may be conjectured
from similarity of relationship or other
such circumstances, that the testator had
the same intention in regard to both.
There must he an apparent design to connect them :" Doe v. 11'estleg, 4 B. & C.

It seems to us that he must have had
in mind a pro rata division according to
to the Statute of Descents, with whien
the law presumes him to have been familiar. Any other construction will not
give meaning to all the words.
667 ; Right v. 'onipton, 9 East 267 ;
"By the law of descent, distributiop
(Goodriqht v. Barron, 11 Id. 220 ; Fenny goes by classes, and this must be prev. Errest,,ce, 4 M. & Sclw. 60.
sumed to be the intention of testators
A second legacy will never be pre- generally, unless the contrary appears.
sumed to be a dependent legacy. To for all are supposed to assent to the genmake it dependent, a clear intention to eral justice of the law on this subject ."
that effect must appear on the face of the Fissel's Appeal, 27 Penn. St. 55.
will: Colt v. Colt, supra.
"It is a reasonable presumption that
The statute of California would also the mind of the testator was familiar with
the statutory rules of distribution ; and
seem to show that in a case like this of
independent clauses, no assistance could if we see in his will an intention to disbe derived from the fact of a prior be- tribute according to that rule, we should
quest to the same persons. Sect. 1322 give it effect all the more readily, because
of the Civil Code of that state provides:
it is provided by law for cases where
"A clear and distinct devise or be- there is no will :" Risk's Appeal, 52
quest cannot be affected by any reasons Penn. St. 269,
assigned therefor, or by any other words
If the testator in this residuary clause
not equally clear and distinct, or by in- had used the term "heirs," instead of
"children," it would have been concluference or argument from other parts of
the will, or by an inaccurate recital of, sive that the surplus must be divided in
or reference to its contents in another the proportion determined by the Statute
part of the will."
of Distributions: Balcom v. Haytnes, 14
But if we look at this residuary clause Allen 204; Daggett v. Slack, 8 Mete.
with the view of determining whether the 453.
And yet it is evident that he used the
testator used the term pro rata, as indieating that the residue of lIds estate should word "children" in a sense synonomous
go to the persons named in unequal pro- with the word "heirs."
In rising from an examination of this
portions according to their degree of kinship to him, as determined by the Statute will, we may agree with Lord ELoof Distribution, we see that be grouped that, "Iit is impossible in these cases to
his sisters and half-sisters together, mak- be sure of hitting the intention," yet we
ing no distinction between the whole and think an interpretation of it, that would
half-blood, neither does the statute of distribute the surplus according to the
California. His nieces he did not merely degree of kinship of the several legatees
mention by name, as in the former part to the testator, would do less violence to
of his will, but he expressly indicated the language and be more in harmony
his relationship to them, grouping them with the settled canons of construction
than any other.
as the law would group them.
C. H. W.
What was his intention'in thus statirg
*he degree of relationship?
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Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
KNAGGS v. GREEN.
An infant who has purchased personal property and given a mortgage upon it to
secure the purchase-moncy, or a part of it, cannot avoid the mortgage under the plea
of infancy without rendering void the sale and losing his rights under it.
An infant purchased a span of horses for $300, paying only $200 down, and giving his note, signed by plaintiff, as surety for the residue of the purchase-money.
The plaintiff was compelled to pay this unpaid purchase-money for the infunt, who
hereupon executed to him a note and chattel mortgage upon the horses for the
amount so paid for him. Shortly thereafter the infant sold the horses to defendant,
who had notice, at the time he purchased, of the existence of the mortgage: Held,
that the plaintiff's indebtedness should be treated as a debt for a part of the purchasemoney of the horses ; that the purchaser from the infant, with notice, stood in no
better position than the infant would have stood had lie not sold the horses, and that
the mortgage was valid as against such purchaser.
APPEAL

from Clark county.

O'Neill & Sheldon for appellant.
MaeBride & Grundy and B. T. French, for appellee.

COLE, J.-Both parties in this case claimed the horses in contrversy through contracts made by George Field, a minor. The
plaintiff claims under a chattel mortgage given by the minor, under

the following circumstances : One Shurtleff sold Field the horses
for $300. Field paid only $200 down and gave his note, signed
by the plaintiff, as surety, for the balance of the purchase-money.

When the note became due Field was unable to pay it and it was
put into judgment. The plaintiff satisfied the judgment. Field
then executed a note and chattel mortgage on the horses for the

amount which the plaintiff bad paid for him.

This mortgage was

duly filed in the town clerk's office where the horses were and where
Field resided. A few months after these transactions took place,

while Field was a minor, he sold the horses to the defendant. It
appears very clearly from the testimony of the defendant that he
knew when he purchased the horses that there was a mortgage on

them, but he assumed that the mortgage was not good for anything
because executed by a minor. There is really no room for dispute
about these facts upon the evidence, and the Circuit Court directed
the jury to find for the plaintiff. The inquiry is, was that direction warranted by the facts of the case ? It is obvious that there

are two conflicting titles to the property derived from the minor,
and the question is, which is to be preferred ? It is claimed on the
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part of the plaintiff that his title should prevail; that because he,
as surety, had to pay a part of the purchase-money, he ought to be
subrogated to the rights of Shurtleff, the vendor. It is argued that
if Field had given a chattel mortgage on the horses to his vendor,
to secure a part of the purchase-money, that he would not be
allowed to avoid the mortgage, on the ground of infancy, without
rescinding the contract and restoring the property; consequently
that a purchaser from him, with full knowledge of the mortgage,
should stand in no better position than the minor would have done
in the case supposed. We are inclined to adopt this view as correct. It seems to us there could be no doubt if Shurtleff had taken
a mortgage on the horses from the minor to secure a part of the
purchase-money that he could enforce it. For, as we understand,
the law is well settled that an infant who has purchased personal
property and given a mortgage upon it to secure the purchase-money,
or a part of it, cannot avoid the mortgage under the plea of infancy
without rendering void the sale and losing his rights under it: Heath
v. West, 28 N. H. 101; Curtiss v. McDougal, 26 Ohio St. 66;
Tyler on Infancy & Coverture p. 78. In Curtiss v. M~cDougal,
which is a case very much in point, the court say: "Without stopping to discuss the general disabilities or privileges of infancy, we
hold that where an infant purchases a chattel, and, at the same
time, and in part performance of the contract of purchase, executes
a mortgage on the purchased property to secure the payment of the
purchase-money, it is not within the privileges of -infancy to avoid
the security given without also avoiding the purchase. If,in such
case, the infant would rescind a part, he must. rescind the whole
contract, and thereby restore to his vendor the title acquired by the
purchase. The privilege of infancy may be used asa shield, but
not as a sword. And in such case, if the infant sells the mortgaged property, the purchaser takes it subject to the mortgage."
In (allis v. Day, 38 Wis. 643, the same principle was applied
to a purchase of real estate by infants, and giving notes and a
mortgage for the purchase-money.
This court decided that the
contract was not void, but only voidable, and the fact that the infants retained possession of the property after reaching their
majority was a ratification of the whole contract and made it binding upon them. See Skinner v. Maxwell, 66 N. 0. 45 ; Corey v.
Burton 32 Mich. 31. The authorities cited in the brief of defendant's counsel certainly show that an infant may avoid a mortgage
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given for a precedent debt, but manifestly such a mortgage stands
upon very different ground from one given for the purchase-money.
It remains then to inquire whether the plaintiff, upon 4he established facts, can have the benefit of the principles of law which we
have been considering. As a surety, as we have already observed,
he paid a part of the purchase-money of the horses. The chattel
mortgage was given to him by the minor for the money so paid.
It seems to us that the indebtedness so contracted should bb treatedas it really was-as a debt for a part of the purchase-money. If
we look at the essence of the transaction, and not the form, this is
what it amounts to. The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to hold the
property as against the defendant, who purchased of the infant with
full knowledge of the existence of the mortgage. In other words,
the defendant must be deemed, in the language of the court in
Curtis v. McDougal, to have taken the property subject to the
mortgage. The plaintiff's title is the elder one and has superior
equities to support it. This view is decisive of the case. The
point made that there was no sufficient demand of the horses anti
refusal before the action was brought seems to us too clearly untenable to require discussion.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
With the limitation that the contract
is an entire one, it is well settled, as
stated in substance in the principal case,
that an infant's contract, if disaffirmed
by him, must be disaffirmed in tote, as
well that portion which is to his advantage as that which is onerous to him.
Thus, where an infant purchases property, real or personal, and gives a mortgage back to secure the purchase-money,
in whole or'in part, it is in law one transaction, and he cannot disaffirm the mortgage without disaffirming the sale, and
c nversely: Robbins v. Eaton, 10 N. H.
551 ; Heath r. TWest, 28 Id. 105; Robertsv. 1Ig7gn, 1 Id. 73; Biqdow v.
Kinney, 3 Vt. 353; Richardson v. Bori;ht, 9 Id. 371 ; Weed-v. -&ebe, 21 Id.
495 ; Hubbardv. Cummingq, 1 Me. 11 ;
Ly,'nde v. Budd, 2 Paige 191 ; Ottman v.
Mo-&k, 3 Sandf. Ch. 431 ; Young v. MfcK"q, 13 Mich. 556 ; Cogley v. Cushman,
16 Minn. 402; Skinner v. Maxwell, 66

N. C. 45. And it makes no difference:
that the notes and mortgage are by agreement of the parties made payable to the
creditor of the grantor, the circumstance,
to whom the consideration is made payable, not chanting the nature of the
transaction : Dana v. Coombs, 6 Me.
89. Where the contract is executory on
the part of the infant, and he disaffirms
it, and still retains the property received
by him thereunder, the adult may, after
demand and refusal, maintain trover, replevin or detinue therefor. When such
contract is avoided, the parties revert to
their original situations, and the adult
becomes again entitled to the possession
of his property, and any detention thereof after demand, becomes wrongful:
Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359., ap
proved in Boyden v. Boyden, 9 Mete.
519 ; .reTord v. Ringgotd, 6 Ala. 544;
dJfzqtar4 v. IVohlford, 15 Gratt. 329 ;
Fitts v. Hill, 9 N. H. 446; Car v.
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Clough, 26 Id. 294 ; Strain v. Wright,
7 Gco. 572 ; Carpenterv. Carpenter, 45
Imd. 142 ; Walker v. Davis,'1 Gray 506.
As to who may avoid the voidable acts
of an infant, the rule is laid down by
Perkius. sect. 12 (in relation to gifts,
grants or deeds), that they "are voidable
by himself, by his heirs, and by those
who have his estate." See Zouch v. Parsons, 3 Burr. 1794 ; El. Land, Jic., Co.
v. Bonner, 75111. 315. While the infant
is alive this privilege of disaffirming his
voidable acts is entirely personal, and
can be exercised by no third person,
stranger or wrongdoer for him. See
Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Black. 511 ; 0iver v. Boudlet, 13 Mass. 237 ; Alsworth
v. Cordtz, 31 Miss. 32 ; Van Branzer v.
Cooper, 2 Johns. 279 ; Jack,,on v. Todd,
6 Id. 257 ; Ward v. Steamboat "Little
Red," 8 Mo. 358 ; Douglas v. Watson,
17 C. B. 691 ; Zouch v. Parsons,supra;
Rose v. Daniel, 3 Brev. 438 ; Murrellv.
The State, 44 Ala. 372; Roberts v.
ll'iggin, 1 N. H. 73. Nor, while lie is
alive, can it be exercised by his heirs or
personal representatives, because, while
living, lie has none; but after his death
his voidable acts may be avoided by his
executors or administrators in cases
where they succeed to his interest, or legally represent the infant: Jefford v.
Ringgold, 6 Ala. 547; Shropshire v.
Burns, 46 Id. 115; Counts v. Bates,
Harper 464; Person v. Chiase, 37 Vt.
650; Parsons v. Hill, 8 Mo. 135;
Breckenridgev. Ormsbg, I J. J. Marsh.
248 ; .S'nth v. .4ayo, 9 Mass. 62 ; Hastings v. Dol'arhide,24 Cal. 207 ; Wilson
v. Porter, 13 La. Ann. 407 ; Vaughan
v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600. So, by his heirs
or privies in blood in cases where they
succeed to his estate: Ferguson v. Bell,
supra; Breckenridge v. Ormsby, supra;
Au itn v. Charlestown Female Seminary,
8 Metc. 203 ; Levering v. Heighe, 2 Md.
Ch. Dec. 88. Although there are some
cases and dicta to the contrary-see
Nelson v. Eaton, I Redf. (N. Y. Sur.)
498; Beler v. Bullitt, 3 A. K. Marsh.

280 ; Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns
14 Johns. 127; Dominick v. Michael, 4
Sandf. 419-it seems settled by the
weight of authority that this privilege
of avoidance is not assignable, and cannot be exercised by his assignees, privies
in law, or by privies in estate only: Ferguson v. Bell, supra; Austin v. Charles-.
town Female San., supra; Levering v.
Heighe, supra ; Breckenridge v. Ormsby.
supra ; Bac. Abr., Infancy 4- Age, I. 6 :
Com. Dig. Enfant, C. 8 ; Ewell's Lead.
Cases 90.
It seems clear from the above decisions
that the defendant in the principal case
could not exercise the infant's right of
disaffirmance. The reasons, however.
assigned for the decision of the court do
not seem satisfactory. While it may be
conceded as settled that, where an infant
purchases a chattel, and at the same time
and in part performance of the contract
of purchase, executes a mortgage on the
purchased property to secure the payment
of the purchase-money, it is not within
the privileges of infancy to avoid the security given without also avoiding the
purchase, the principal case does not seem
to be such a case. It seems decidedly
far-fetched to say that the debt in this
case was a debt for the purchase-money,
and to consider tie whole as one entire
transaction, when the record shows that
the horses were not purchased of the
plaintiff, and the mortgage in question
was not executed till after the original
sale and payment in full had been entirely
completed. The mortgage in this case
grew out of the plaintiff's being compelled
to pay the note which he signed for the
infant, and was intended to secure a
debt which, till such payment was
made by the plaintiff, had no existence. In other words, the debt, to secure which this mortgage was executed,
had no existence till after the original
sale was complete and payment of the
residue of the purchase-money made. It
seems clearly to be a mortgage fur a precedent debt.

DAMON'S APPEAL.
An unconditional sale and delivery by
an infant to a third party of chattels
mortgaged by the infant, is a disaffirmance of the mortgage: Chapinv. Shafer,
49 N. Y. 412; State v. Plaisted, 43 N.
H. 413. Such being the law, as it seems
to the writer, the first sale and the mortgage of the chattels not being one entire

transaction, when the infant subsequently
sold the property to the defendant, he
avoided the mortgage as he had a right
to do even before majority (Stafford v.
Roof, 9 Cow. 626), and the plaintiff wan
without remedy at law.
2NIARSHALL D. EWELL
Chicago, April 22d 1880.

Supreme Judieial Court of 3faine.
DAMON'S APPEAL.
The Constitution of the United States does not prohibit the enactment of an insolvent law by a state.
The insolvent act of Maine having been enacted while the federal bankrupt law was
in force, went into full operation upon repeal of the bankrupt law, and not before.
A statute may be passed to go into effect at a future date, and it is immaterial
whether the suspension of its operation be by its own express provision or by virtue of some paramount law, as e. g. the existence of an Act of Congress on the
same subject.
The provision of stat. 1878, c. 74, sect. 15, authorizing the sequestration of the
estate of an insolvent without previous notice to him, is not unconstitutional for that
cause.

ON exceptions. On December 9th 1878, the judge of the Court
of Insolvency, on application of the creditors of the appellant,
issued a warrant for taking possession of the appellant's estate, in
accordance with the provisions of stat. 18 7 8 , c. 74, §§ 14, 15. The
warrant was made returnable December 24th 1878, and ordered
the appellant to then appear.
On return-day, Damon appeared before the Court of Insolvency,
resisted the prayer of the application, and filed a motion alleging,
in substance, that he was adjudged an insolvent on December 9th
1878, on the petition of his creditors, and without any notice to
himself, contrary to the law of the land; that the statute under
which he was so adjudged is unconstitutional and void, for that
when said statute was enacted, to wit, February 21st 1878, the
federal bankrupt law was in force and so continued until September
1st 1878 ; that the state statute did not take effect upon its passage, or at the expiration of thirty days after the recess of the legislature which enacted it, by reason of the federal bankrupt law;
and that the state statute never became of effect. The prayer of
the motion was for a dismissal of the proceedings against him.
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The-judge of the Court of Insolvency overruled the-motion; and
Damon appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court.
The presiding justice of the Appellate Court ruled, as matter of
law, that the decree appealed from be affirmed. Thereupon the
appellant alleged exceptions.
Hutchinson, Savage &- Hale, for the appellant, cited 1 Kent Com.
387; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 21 ; Rev. Stat., c. 1, sect. 3 ;
Const. Maine, art. 1, sects. 1, 9; U. S. Const. 7th Amend., 14th
Amend.; Barron v. Mayor Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Taylor v.
Porter,4 Hill. 140; Mass. Stat. different.
Frye, Cotton &' White, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
APPLETON, C. J.-The insolvent law of this state, c. 74 of the
Acts of 1878, was enacted while the Bankrupt Law of the United
States was in full operation. The proceedings in the case before
us are under the insolvent law of this state, and were commenced
since the repeal of the Bankrupt Law.
I. It is objected that the statute of this state is unconstitutional
and void, because enacted while the Bankrupt Act of the United
States was in full force.
It is provided by sect. 8 of the first article of the Constitution
of the United States that "1Congress shall have power * * *to
establish * * *

uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies

throughout the United States." Here is no prohibition against the
passage of bankrupt or insolvent laws by the states. As long as
the national government abstains from legislation on this subject
the states may act. "It is sufficient to say," observes MARSHALL,
C. J., in Sturges v. Crowninslield, 4 Wheat. 122, "that until the
power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies be exercised by Congress, the states are not forbidden to pass a bankrupt
law, provided it contain no principle which violates the tenth section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States."
The right of the states to pass insolvent or bankrupt laws, and that
the power given to the United States is not exclusive, has been repeatedly affirmed: Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet. 348; Cook v. Moffat,
5 How. 310; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223.
If there is a state law on the subject, the subsequent passage of
a bankrupt law by Congress neither repeals nor annuls it. It only
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suspends its operation so far as the law of the state may be in conflict with the Act of Congress. As was said by BARTOL, C. J., in
Lavender v. Gosnell, 43 Md. 153, "the Act of Congress suspends
the state law but does not repeal it. Proceedings commenced under
the state law prior to the passage of the Bankrupt Act may be carried on to their final termination in accordance with the provisions
of the state law :" Judd v. Ives, 4 Metc. 401 ; Chamberlainv. Perkins, 51 N. H. 337.
A voluntary assignment by a debtor for the benefit of his creditors, under the insolvent law of the state, is primafacie an act of
bankruptcy within the thirty-fifth section of the Bankrupt Act of
1867, but such an assignment, no proceedings in bankruptcy having
been instituted, remains valid, unless such proceedings are instituted
within six months thereafter: Nkaltbie v. Hotchkiss, 38 Conn. 80.
The insolvent law of this state is not wholly superseded by the
Bankrupt Act of the United States, but when they come in conflict,
the latter must prevail: Hawkins's Appeal, 34 Conn. 549; Geery's Appeal, 43 Id. 289. In Iowa it was held that the state insolvent law was not nullified, superseded or suspiended by the bankruptcy law, and that jurisdiction might be exercised under the
fbrmer until proceedings have been commenced under the Act of
Congress : Reed v. Taylor, 32 Iowa 209. But it is not required to
go to the length of the case last referred to.
While the bankrupt law is in full force, it has, or may have,
jurisdiction of cases within its provisions. "Upon the repeal of
that law," observes DEWEY, J., in Atkins v. Spear, 8 Met. 491,
"the insolvent law of Massachusetts was revived, and with its
revival all the limitations and restrictions upon the right to a dis..
charge revived, although the acts occurred during its suspension."
The bankrupt law merely suspending the state insolvent laws,
upon its repeal they at once revive and need not be re-enacted:
Lavender v. Gosnell, supra. "If the right of the states to pass
a bankrupt law is not taken away by the mere grant of the power
to Congress," observes MARSHALL, C. J., in Sturgis v. C'rowninshild, supra, "it cannot be extinguished; it can only be suspended by the enactment of a general bankrupt law. The repeal
of that law cannot, it is true, confer the power on the states; but
it removes a disability to its exercise, which was created by the
Act of Congress."
It follows from these decisions that a state insolvent law is not
VOL. XXVIII.U-47
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unconstitutional, and that it is neither repealed, annulled nor ren.
dered void by the passage of the bankrupt law, for proceedings
commenced under its provisions may be completed, notwithstanding the existence of a bankrupt law enacted after their commencement, and because the moment the Act of Congress is repealed the
state law at once revives. It is evident, therefore, that the state
law has vitality notwithstanding and during the existence of the
paramount law of the United States, for if it was void by the Act
of Congress it could not revive.
We now come to the question whether the state can pass an
insolvent or bankrupt law during the existence of an Act of Congress on the subject. In other words, whether the act under discussion is in force. Its validity is unquestioned unless absolutely
void in its inception.
No constitutional provision has been violated, for the passage of
such a law is not merely not prohibited, but it is impliedly
sanctioned by the clause giving Congress power over the subjectmatter of bankruptcies. The legislature may pass a law to take
effect instantly, or at a future day, or on the happening of a future
event. If the statute bad said that it was to take effect upon and
after the repeal of the bankrupt law of Congress, there could have
been no doubt as to its validity. But such is the precise effect of
the law without the insertion of any such provision. The Act
of Congress is the paramount law on the subject when called into
action. The law of the state is subordinate to it. The efficient
action of the state law is suspended for the time being precisely as
in the cases already considered, when a national bankrupt law was
passed subsequently to a state law on the same subject. The state
may pass a law which is subordinate to the paramount authority
of national legislation, and is only subordinate to tlhat, but which,
when that ceases to have force by reason of its repeal, has at once
the vigor of law. Whether the law of the state is existent and
superseded by the subsequent legislation of Congress, or is inoperative by reason of precedent congressional action, can make no
difference. In either case the efficiency of the state law is alike
suspended and in abeyance while the Act of Congress is in force,
and when that is repealed the law of the state at once and instantly
becomes operative, and action may be had under its provisions.
II. It is urged that the law was invalid because it did not go
into complete operation after its passage. But that is not requisite
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to its validity. It does go into partial operation on its passage.
It was a law valid in all respects, and to be obeyed, except so far as
it was in conflict with the statute of the United States. When
that conflict ceased, the law went into full operation. It was a
law to go into full effect when it ceased to be in conflict with the
Act of Congress, and whether that was inserted in the act, or left
as the legal result from the relation of the state and national
government to each other, can make no difference.
III. It is claimed that the act is in violation of the state constitution, because, as the appellant's counsel allege, it provides by
section fifteen that the debtor may be adjudged bankrupt, and his
property, without notice to him in the first instance, may be
sequestered.
This is not a new question. It was raised in Massachusetts
under provisions similar to those of the act under consideration in
Ximball v. 3_orris, 2 Met. 579. "The object of authorizing the
preliminary proceedings seems to have been to provide in the first
place for a sequestration of the property of the debtor, upon an
exparte application of a creditor, and in this respect does not differ
from proceedings by writ of injunction, issued for the purpose of
preserving the property in its present state." A similar question
arose in relation to the power of bank commissioners to restrain
banking corporations from acting, by injunction issued before any
hearing, in Commonwealth v. Farmers' & fechanie' Bank, 21
Pick. 542, and the constitutionality of the statute giving such
power was affirmed. Indeed, the statute gives no more power
than was conferred by the bankrupt law of the United States:
Rev. Stat. U. S., § 5024. It authorizes the sequestration of the
property of the debtor on certain conditions by warrant duly issued
by the judge of insolvency. By the law of the state any creditor,
of his own mere motion, may seize by attachment, without prior
notice, all the attachable property of his debtor, or he may, after
taking the prescribed oath, arrest his person. Much more, then,
may he sequestrate the attachable property of his debtor under the
sanction of a warrant issued by a magistrate upon application under
oath: O'Neil v. Glover, 5 Gray 144.
Exceptions overruled.
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Supreme Court of Connecticut.
SAMUEL HUBBARD v. SYDNEY A. ENSIGN.
The language of a deed-poll may be such as to afford sufficient evidence, after it
has been accepted by the grantee, of a promise by him ; but, as the language is that
of the grantor, doubtful or ambiguous expressions will not ordinarily be sufficient.
The plaintiff exchanged lands with the defendant, that conveyed by the plaintiff
being subject to two mortgages of $10,000 and $5000. The deed given by the plaintiff, after describing the land and the mortgages, contained the following clause:,
"The above-described property is alone to be holden for the payment of beth the
above debts ;" also an exception to the covenant against encumbrances as follows :
"Except the above mortgages of $15,000, which are a part consideration of the
deed." The mortgages which covered other land of the plaintiff, were afterwards
foreclosed, and the plaintiff lost his own land, and besides was afterwards compelled
to pay the second mortgage. In a suit brought by him to recover of the defendant
the amount so paid by him and the value of his land which had been taken, it was
held :
I. That the first of the above clauses was not to be construed as meaning that the
defendant assumed a personal obligation to pay the mortgage debts.
2. That its probable meaning was that the lands conveyed to the defendant were
to be charged with the whole of the mortgage debt, and that the defendant was not.
to require that any portion of it should be set to the la,1 d retained by the plaintiff.
3. That the fact that the mortgage debt was stated to be a part of the consideration, the sale having been in fact of the mere equity, did not make the defendant
liable to make good to the plaintiff the amount which he had to pay on the second
mortgage.
4. That there was no liability of the defendant upon which the plaintiff could
recover.
It is well established that the real contract in pursuance of which a-deed is given
may be shown by parbl. In such cases, as in all others of contract, the effort of the
court is to give effect to the intention of the parties, if it can be done consistently
with che rules of law.

THE plaintiff exchanged certain real estate, in the city of Hartford, subject to two mortgages (also covering other real estate of
the plaintiff) for certain real estate of the defendant in the city of
Brooklyn, also subject to a mortgage. The deed from the plaintiff
to the defendant, after describing the land and the mortgages
thereon, contained the following tlause: "The above-described property is alone to be holden for the payment of both the above debts."
There was also an exception to the covenant against encumbrances
as follows: "Except the above-written mortgages of $15,000, which
are a part consideration of this deed." The mortgages of $15,000
referred to were subsequently foreclosed, whereby the plaintiff lost
the equity in other lands embraced in them and not included in
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the deed to the defendant. The plaintiff paid or satisfied the second mortgage after it had been foreclosed.
This action was brought on an alleged promise, contained in the
defendant's deed, to pay these mortgages, to recover the amount
paid on the second mortgage, and the value of the other property
lost by the foreclosure.
R. D. Hubbardand E. Goodman, for the plaintiff.
H. S. Barbour and S.

. Jones, for the defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-The language of a deed poll may be such as to
afford sufficient evidence of a promise by the grantee after the deed
has been accepted by him; but, as the language is that of the
grantor, doubtful or ambiguous expressions will not ordinarily be
regarded as sufficient. In Foster v. Atwater, 42 Conn. 244, the
language, referring to the mortgages, is: "Which, with accrued
interest, the grantee assumes and agrees to pay and save me harmless from the same." In Pike v. Brown, 7 Cush. 133, the language is, "which said sum is a part of the consideration before named,
and this deed is on condition that said Pike shall assume and pay
said note and the interest thereon as they severally become due and
payable." In each of these cases there is a clearly expressed intention that the grantee should become personally liable.
An estate may also be given on condition, or the deed may contain some stipulations in the nature of a condition or proviso, that
the grantor shall do and perform certain things. In such cases the
condition or stipulation co-operates with the grantee's acceptance
of the deed and imposes upon him the obligations named: Randall
v. Latham, 36 Conn. 48; Biting v. Clinton Mills Company, 36
Conn. 296. But those cases are not precisely in point. The question here is, whether the defendant's deed, and its acceptance by
him, impose upon him a personal obligation to pay the mortgagedebts ?
In considering this question, it is important to ascertain the intention of the parties. In this as in other transactions, when that
is discovered, effect will be given to it if it can be done consistently
with the rules of law. We are looking now for evidence of that
intention in the language of the deed. In interpreting that language, we are to place ourselves in the position of the parties as
nearly as may be.
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The parties, upon the terms of an exchange, have come together to
execute deeds and other writings to carry their agreement into effect.
,One thing agreed upon is, that the defendant should personally
obligate himself to pay the two mortgages, amounting to $15,000,
and the scrivener is-instructed to incorporate that agreement in the
deed. We expect him to write in plain, unambiguous language,
substantially as follows: "The grantee, by accepting this deed,
agrees to pay both said mortgages and indemnify and save the
grantor harmless." That expresses the intention of the parties
fully, and leaves no room for question or doubt. That is a natural
and easy thing to do. But instead of that he writes: "The above
described property is alone to be holden for the payment of both
of the above debts." Is it to be supposed that any intelligent man,
especially if he had the advice of an able and astute lawyer, would
accept that as an evidence of such an agreement? In this connection, it must be borne in mind, that the deed is his instrument,
is being prepared under his instructions, and assuming such a contract to have been made, he will have no difficulty in having it inserted in clear and intelligible language. The fact that he did not
do so, but in lieu thereof had a clause inserted that will biar
another meaning equally well, if not better, is pretty conclusive
evidence that no such agreement was in fact made.
But the question recurs, what does the language of the deed
mean? If we are right in our supposition that it did not mean to
import a personal liability to pay the debts and save the plaintiff
harmless, it is enough to defeat the plaintiff's claim, and we are relieved of the necessity of determining its real meaning. But if
it can be otherwise interpreted, and a meaning attributed to it
which is more consistent with the conduct and situation of the parties, it adds greatly to the force of the argument, that it does not
mean what the plaintiff claims that it does. At best the expression is ambiguous. To give it the most favorable construction for
the grantee, and perhaps we shall be justified in doing that, its
meaning may be that the plaintiff agreed that the land described
in the deed, and that alone of all the defendant's property, should
be liable for those debts. That interpretation clearly excludes any
personal liability, and all liability aside from the land conveyed.
But if that construction is inadmissible it may mean that the
grantee takes the land subject to the whole of the mortgage-debts,
and that he will not require any portion of the debts to be appor-
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tioned to other lands of the plaintiff embraced in the mortgage.
This is in harmony with a subsequent clause which states that the
mortgages of $15,000 "are a part consideration of this deed."
To illustrate this view. Suppose the land conveyed to the
defendant had been more than sufficient to pay both mortgages,
then doubtless the defendant would have paid them and would not
have permitted a foreclosure. In that event the plaintiff's other
land would have been free of the encumbrances and the defendant
would have been bound by his agreement not to call on the plaintiff
for a contribution. That probably was just what the parties contemplated, and that is what they intended by the language of the
deed.
But an unlooked for contingency arose. The property depreciated so that the whole property mortgaged was barely sufficient to
pay the mortgage debts, and the creditors insisted upon foreclosing
the whole. The plaintiff now claims that the defendant agreed, m
substance, that the land he received should be sufficient to pay the
mortgages, and if not, that he would pay the deficiency and thereby
save the plaintiff harmless. That, as it seems to us, adds materially
to the language used, and interprets it as if written, "The above
described property is alone to be holden for the payment of both of
the abbve debts, and if it is not sufficient for that purpose the
grantee shall pay the deficiency." We are not aware of any rule
of interpretation that will justify such a construction.
But the plaintiff insists that under that clause in the deed which
states that the mortgages are a part of the consideration, the defendant is liable for the amount of the second mortgage paid by the
plaintiff. The plaintiff here assumes that the contract between the
parties was a sale of the property for the consideration of $26,000,
while in fact the contract was to sell to the defendant the equity of
redemption merely, and the consideration was not $26,000 in money,
but the equity of redemption in certain property in Brooklyn.
Thus the real transaction between the parties effectually repels any
implication of a contract from that clause in the deed. That the
real contract in pursuance of which the deed was given may be
shown by parol is well established: Collins v. Tillou, 26 Conn.
368; Post v. Gilbert, 44 Id. 9.
The finding shows that the parties "stipulated and agreed that
neither party should, by accepting any deed given in pursuance of
said arrangement, assume any personal liability in respect to any
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mortgage on the premises thereby conveyed." The obje ,jr.that
parol evidence cannot be admitted to prove this agreeme. . cannot
be sustained. The authorities just cited, and many other.., are conclusive on that point. As we have seen, the defendant d d not expressly agree to pay the mortgages, and the language of' the deed
alone is not sufficient to raise such a promise. And now the actuU
contract being shown, it emphatically negatives any such promiseJudgment is advised for the defLndant.
Our readers will find the principles
raised in the foregoing decision, which
have assumed great importance during
tfle depression in the value of real estate
in the last five or six years, very learn-

edly and ably considered, w.th refetaeuie
to all the cases, in two arti~es on The
Assumption of EncumbraLces by the
Purchaser of Land, 18 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 337 and 401.

Superior Court of New York, General Term, Januarq1880.
SALVATOR CARO v. TIE METROPOLITAN ELEVATED
RAILWAY COMPANY.
The term "property" embraces every species of valuable right and interest,
including real and personal property, easements, franchises and incorporeal hereditaments.
Any injury to property by a work for the public benefit which deprives the
owner of the ordinary use of it, is equivalent to a taking and entitles him to com.
pensation.
The owner of a house on a street in a city has a right to the use and occupation
of it, free from disturbance by noises, smoke, smells, &c., which amount to a nuisance, and such disturbance when made by a railroad constitute a taking'of property
for which compensation must be made.
A charter from the legislature prevents a railroad from being a public nuisance,
but does not prevent private property-owners from being entitled to compersation
for the injury to their property resulting from the operation of the railroad.
An owner of a house on a street in the city of New York, is entitled to recover
for the injury by reason of the construction and operation of an elevated railroad on
the street in front of his property.

THIs was a bill of complaint in equity, setting forth at considerable length, inter alia, the following facts:

1. That the plaintiff in 1874 bought a parcel of land of about one
hundred feet by half the block on the northerly side of Fifty-third
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street, between Sixth and Ninth avenues, in the city of New York,
abutting on said street, from Mr. Talman, for the price of $8000,
and built a dwelling-house thereon at an expense of $30,000, and
with his family has resided there from 1875 to the present time;
that the title to the land was derived by mesne conveyances from
James J. Bertine. That when Fifty-third street was opened to
the public in 1838, and the fee therein vested in the city of New
York, this parcel of land extended southerly to a line coincident
with the present centre line of said street, and was in its entire
extent the property of Bertine. That in opening the street the
city took so much of said land as lay between the line coincident
with the centre line of said street, and the southerly line of said
lot. That it was determined by the commissioners of appraisal
that the benefit and advantage to Bertine by reason of his interest
in the land over and above the loss and damage to him from the
opening of the street, and for relinquishing his interest in the land
for the purpose of the opening, amounted to the sum of $5.80.
That as successor and privy in interest and estate to Bertine,
plaintiff is entitled to the undiminished possession and enjoyment
of said benefit and advantage, and of such he cannot be deprived
without just compensation, or due process of law.
H. That defendant is a corporation under an Act of tne Legis.
lature of New York, passed June 17th 1872 (being chap. 865, Lawb
of 1872,) and various supplements thereto; and that by virtue of said
corporate powers, the defendant (at the time of filing the complaint
herein, September 14th 1878,) wrongfully and without legal author.
ity or justification, other than as hereinabove set forth, threatens,
and intends and is about to enter upon, excavate and occupy said
Fifty-third street, for the purposes of constructing, maintaining and
operating a double-track elevated steam railway, together with
platforms, switches, depots, turn-outs and stairways, and with a
row of columns upon the line of each curb, and a superstructure
carrying two tracks upon transverse girders spanning the street;
that such entry, excavations and occupancy, and the so constructing,
maintaining and operating such railway, with its said accessories,
will be an unlawful appropriation of said street, contrary to the
terms and intent of the trust, upon which the city of New York
acquired and still holds the title to said land for the uses and
purposes of a public street only, and will impede, obstruct and
VoL. XXVIIL-48
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embarrass the use of said street as a public street, highway and
thoroughfare, and will constitute a public nuisance.
III. That against plaintiff's will, and wrongfully and without
legal authority other than hereinabove set forth, defendant has
entered upon and occupied said street from curb to curb in front of
plaintiff's said lot and dwelling-house, and is about to construct,
maintain and operate thereon the said elevated steam railway,
whereby, and in consequence of the noise, stench, obstruction of
light, and exposure of the privacy of plaintiff's said dwelling-house,
defendant will cause grievous discomfort, inconvenience and hurt to
plaintiff and his said family, will greatly embarrass and diminish
his and their comfortable occupancy and enjoyment of said lot and
dwelling-house; will subject said right, interest and easement to an
unlawful and oppressive burden from which they now are and of
right ought to be exempt, and will essentially and enormously
reduce the value of plaintiff's said lot and dwelling-house ; that for
the aforesaid wrongs and injuries defendant has neither made nor
offered plaintiff any compensation, nor has defendant by recourse
to the right of eminent domain accorded to it by law, taken any
step to compensate plaintiff for any of said wrongs and injuries.
IY. That if the said railway be permitted to be built and operated
along said street and in front of plaintiff's said lot, piece or parcel
of land as above described, plaintiff will be subjected to a continuing nuisance and to wrongs and injuries which will-involve him in
interminable litigation and for which damages will afford him no
appropriate or adequate relief; that as plaintiff is informed and
believes, defendant is insolvent and unable to pay any judgment
for damages that might be recovered against it, and as plaintiff is
informed and believes, has mortgaged its entire property for a sum
far beyond its value, so that any execution against it would be idle
and fruitless.
I Wherefore plaintiff demands judgment that defendant be restrained and enjoined from any and every act towards the constructing, maintaining and operating its said elevated steam railway,
or any part or accessory thereof along said street in front of plaintiff's
said lot, piece or parcel of land ; and for other and further relief, &c.
To this complaint defendant demurred, on the ground that it did
not set forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and upon
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the report of a referee, the court, at special term, sustained the
demurrer. Thereupon plaintiff appealed to the general term.
Roger A. Pryor,attorney and counsel for plaintiff. Benjamin
F?. Butler, of counsel.
Porter, Lowrey, Soren and Stone, attorneys for defendant.
Gro8venor P. Lowrey and John K. Porter,of counsel.
1. It is the settled la-w of this state that the fee-simple title to
lands in streets in this city, opened under the Act of 1813, is in
the mayor, aldermen and commonalty, without interest or estate of
any kind in either the original owner of such lands or the successive owners of lots abutting on such streets; and it is equally well
settled that no private property or interest is taken (within the
meaning of the constitution) when a new use is imposed upon the
lands in such streets: Sixth Avenue Railroad Co. v. Gilbert
.Elevated Railroad Co., 43 Jones & Spencer 292; Spader v.
Elevated Railroad Co., 3 Abbott N. C. 467 ; Story v. Same, Id.
468; The People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188; Patten v. New York
Elevated Railroad Co., 3 Abbott N. C. 345.
2. The plaintiff has no interest in lands in the street adjoining
his lot, nor in the use thereof, different from that possessed by the
general public, and every individual member thereof: Matter of
Ninth Avenue, 45 N. Y. 732; Brooklyn Park v. Armstrong, 45
N. Y. 243-; Rexford v. Knight, 1 Kern. 314; Cemetery Co. v.
P. P. 4 C. . Railroad Co., 68 N. Y. 593.
3. The construction and maintenance of the defendant's road
being authorized by law cannot be the cause of legal injury to any
person; nor the subject of any action for damages or restraint.
And the operation of the same when completed, can be made the
subject of action for malfeasance or misfeasance only.
1 4. The trust imposed on the city in respect of streets acquired
under the Act of 1813, is pulliijuris;subject to the sole control
of the legislature; and may be revoked or modified even to the
extent of closing a street without the consent of, and without
causing legal injury to, any private owner. In such a case the
lands would not revert either to the original owner thereof or to
the present owner of adjacent lands. Such injury or prejudice to
private owners as may, in fact, follow from the imposition of new
burdens upon or the appropriation of such streets to new uses are
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damnum absque injuria: Heyward v. Mayor, etc., 3 Selden 314;
Fearingv. Irwin, 55 N. Y. 486; Co8ta v. Mayor, etc., 43 N. Y.
399; People v. Kerr, 27 N. Y. 188, 213 and 214; Metropolitan
Board of Health v. Heister, 87 N. Y. 661.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SPEIR, J.-The action is brought on the equity side of the court
to restrain the committing a nuisance and for the redress of wrongs
and injuries which will involve the plaintiff in vexatious litigation.
The issue presents a naked question of law arising on a demurrer
to the complaint, where, if the facts are properly pleaded, they are
admitted.
The contentions on the part of the plaintiff and appellant are,
1. "That the owner and occupant of a lot of land and dwellinghouse, abutting on the street, has a right to the use and enjoyment
of such lot and dwelling-house free from the disturbance and invasion of such right, which is admitted by the demurrer, and that
such disturbance and invasion constitute a takin9 of property in
the sense of the constitutional inhibition."
2. "Independent of such constitutional guaranty, the injury
inflicted by the defendant upon plaintiff's lot and dwelling-house,
as set out in the complaint and admitted by the demurrer, qonstitutes a wrong entitling him to relief by injunction."
It is claimed by the defendant that the propositions above stated
are not new, but, on the contrary, have been carefully considered
and determined by this court, the Court of Common Pleas, and,
as they believe, practically determined by the Court of Appeals.
It was admitted and the following concessions were made in
advance by the plaintiff's counsel:
1. That the fee of the streets for the purpose named in- the Act
of 1813 is in the city of New York.
2. That the appellant has no easement or other interest in the
soil of the street which the respondent invades.
3. That there is a constitutional law authorizing the defendant to
build an elevated railroad upon the street in front of appellant's
dwelling.
4. That under the law there are no restrictions as to the manneof building or operating the railroad-and that the damages which
may be recovered must be for injuries directly or immediately
caused by the construction or operation of the road, in the manner
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in which it is, or may hereafter be constructed or operated, and
not remote and consequential.
We have examined the decisions in the Court of Appeals and
others to which we have been referred, but in none of them, as we
believe, have the points presented by the appellant been adjudicated.
In the case of the Gilbert Elevated Railroad Co. v. Anderson, 70
N. Y. 361, Chief Justice CHURCH in delivering the opinion, says,
"The amount or extent of the damages are questions not properly
beore the court. * * * To determine what particular occupation
of the streets is to be deemed a legitimate public use, involves
important and delicate questions. They were very much debated
in this court in the surface railroad cases, and the principles adjudicated in those cases will be regarded as obligatory upon the court
in deciding future cases." This decision as to this point was
concurred in by the other learned judges of the court. This exprssion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals amounts to a
poAtive assertion, that the points presented for discussion are new
and undetermined. Nor can it be maintained that the decisions of
this court in Sixth Avenue Railroad Co., 43 Superior Court R. 292,
or the Court of Common Pleas in Patten v. NVew York levated
Railroad Co., 3 Abbott's New Cases 345, relied on by the defendant, are authority in support of its position, since in both cases the
points raised by the defendant here as having been adjudicated in
those cases were neither presented nor decided.
Among the principles applied to the surface railroad cases, we
refer to an expression of two of the judges in the case reported in
Matter of New York Elevated Railroad Co., 70 N. Y. 327.
The claim made in the case rested on the assumption that the
abutting owners of property upon the streets have property rights
therein, of which they were to be deprived, and for which they are
entitled under the constitution to compensation. The answer to
this by Mr. Justice EARL was, "Whether they have-such property
rights it will not be necessary to determine on this appeal, for the
reason that provision is made for compensation." Mr. Justice
ALLEN, concurring, says, "I am of the opinion that the several
acts, as a whole, did make ample provision for such compensation,
and that every property right of individuals, including whatever
right or interest, by way of easement, appurtenant to these lands
or otherwise, owners of lots abutting on the streets have in such
streets, as well as those, the fee of which is in the city, under the
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Laws of 1813, as the other streets, must, under the constitution
and the statutes under which these proceedings are had, be comThe learned judge was further of the opinion,
pensated for."
that unless such provision for compensation was made by the
statute to individuals for every property right and interest, whether
corporeal or incorporeal, which would be invaded in the constructin
and operation of the railway, the statute could not be sustained.
The principles applicable to the steam surface railroads are clearly
stated by the court in Drake v. The Hudson River Bailroad Co.,
7 Barb. 508. This is an early and may be considered a leading
case in determining the rights of owners of property bounded on
the streets in this city, and the rights of the steam railroad company, in common with others, to use the same under rules and
regulations prescribed by the'proper authority. Judge JONES, late
Chief Justice of this court, furnishes the leading opinion, whose
learning and great familiarity with the subject no one will question.
He first came to the conclusion, which has generally been receiyed
and adopted by the profession, that the streets of this city were
dedicated to public uses, and vested in the corporation upon trust,
so that the same should be kept open as public streets for the
use of the citizens of New York for ever, in such manner as
streets then were or should at any time thereafter be beneficially
used by lawful authority for the purpose of public city streets. That
the common council of the city were vested with the regulation of
the streets, who were to prescribe and direct the manner and mode
:f using them.
After alluding to the then recent introduction of railroads, their
great and acknowledged advantages over all other modes of travel
which had brought them into extensive use, the learned judge
proceeds : "Desirable improvements of public utility and beneficial
inventions of general interest are not to be rejected, suppressed or
arrested, simply because they may in their operation and practical
effect occasion to property in their vicinity or within the sphere of
their action some contingent or consequential damage. For when
they occur the party aggrieved has a remedy by action at law, and
by repetition of such. action during the continuance of the grievance
whenever and as often as loss or damage ensue; and with the
ulterior remedy which in case the presence of tracks in the streets
or the running of the cars upon them, or other operations of
the railroad, should be or become a nuisance, or the aggression
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shall prove to be permanent and without an adequate remedy by
action, this court will be competent to administer its equitable relief
b.y injunction to prevent its continuance or for it8 removal."
It is proper to say that in this case the injunction was dissolved,
as it did not appear -from the complaint and affidavits that the
mischief was irremediable, which damages could not compensate,
and did not reach to the very substance and value of the estate and
tend to the destruction of it in the character in which it was

enjoyed.
It is urged that no private property or interest is taken within
the meaning of the constitution, where.a new use is imposed upon
the lands in such streets, by which is meant the operation of a railroad by steam, elevated above the surface of the street. This, we
think, has no special pertinency in the case now before us, since it
is conceded that by the terms of the law there are no restrictions
upon the manner of buihling nor as to the manner of operating the
road-that it may be operated with any means, in any manner;
that the defendant has the right to use the road, although it be a
new mode of using the public streets, for the reason that it is one
mode of using it-and, finally, that the law is constitutional, as it
provides under limitations not to injure private property without
compensation, and that if no such provision was made it would be
simply void. When the cases of the surface steam railroads were
first debated in the courts the use imposed upon the lands was as
new, and prior thereto, as little known or anticipated as the present
elevated road. The conclusion reached in all the surface railroad
cases was, that merely operating the roads by steam on the surface
could not be deemed a nuisance, not because it was a new use of
the road, but that the law authorized the use as a mode of travel
which did not encroach upon private rights.
It is claimed, when the injury to individual rights of property
are very great and plainly perceptible, that it becomes the duty of
the law-making power to distribute the burden among the general
public, rather than leave it to be borne solely upon whom it falls.
And it was gravely urged that this must always be a question of
"statesmanship "to be specially considered whenever the occasion
arises, as the provisions of law cannot safely deal with it. The
constitution being paramount to the statutes, and the laws enacted
by the legislature and intended to protect the citizen in the enjoyment of his property in every possible relation of life, it would
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seem that the courts alone can dispose of the question when and how
payment shall be made for private property taken for public use. It
may be admitted that the burdens imposed upon individuals by
legislative enactments may become too oppressive to be patiently
borne, but the remedy must only be found with the law-making
power of the government. To this question there can be no solution by an appeal to the fixed and permanent principles of law and
equiy. It has been well said by the present learned Chief Justice
of our highest court: " We should all regard a departure by the
courts from rules of law wisely established for the protection of all
to meet the equities of a particular case or class of cases, as a far
greater evil than that sought to be remedied."
The term "property " is of the largest import and embraces
every mode in which it may be applied to public use, and extends
to every species of valuable right and interest, and includes real
and personal property, easements, franchises and incorporeal hereditaments. The courts will interfere by injunction to secure to a
party the bare privilege conferred by statute: Croton Turnpike
Co. v. Ryder, 1 Johns. Ch. 610; NZrewburgh Turnpike Co. v.
Miller, 5 Id. 101; Boston 4' Lowell Railroad Co. v. The Salem
& Lowell Railroad Co., 2 Gray 1. In the last case, SHAw, Chief
J., says: "It is a right or title, which, if it exists at all, is purely
a statute right; it is created by law, it exists only in contemplation of law, it is invisible, intangible, incapable of physical possession and depends on the law for its protection." Any injury to
the property of an individual, which deprives the owner of the ordinary use of it is equivalent to a taking, and entitles him to compensation : Cooley on Constitutional Limitations 542.
Even
claims for compensation for the possession, use or appropriation of
tangible property, constitute personal estate equally with property
out of which they grow, although the validity of such claims may
be denied, and their value may depend upon the uncertainties of
litigation, or the doubtful result of an appeal to the legislature:
-Erwin v. United States, 7 Otto 396.
It is elementary law that the corrupting the air of a man's dwelling with noisome smells is a nuisance-for light and air are two
indispensable requisites to every dwelling. Lord MANSFIrLD has
said that it is not necessary that the smell should be even unwholesome; it is enough if it renders the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable: 3 Black. Com. 219: 1 Burr. 337. Duke ofraor-
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thumberland v. Glowe8, 3 Chitty's Blackst. (Sharswood's ed.) 217.
In a word, we think it may be said that there is an inherent, absolute right of property in every man, which consists in the free use,
enjoyment and disposal of all his acquisitions without control or
diminution, save only by the laws of the land; and "so great is
the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize
the least violation of it." Although there are many individual
possessions in life denominated in common use and by law private,
yet when we come to speak of a man's dwelling-house, the abode
of his social and domestic life, the word private seems to have been
used by the early writers in another and more significant sense. In
Semayne'8 ca8e, 3 Coke 185-91 b, it is said: "The house,
as to every one, is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his
defence as for his repose."
The subject of controversy is a mere naked incorporeal right
claimed by the plaintiff, to have and enjoy his land and dwellinghouse free from the invasion arising from the constructing and
operating an elevated steam railway, producing noises, stench, obstruction of light and air, causing grievous disturbance to himself
and family, thereby rendering his residence undesirable, and greatly
reducing the market value thereof. If this right exists and has
been invaded, the proper and specific remedy which shall prevent
the continuing invasion is by injunction and is within the ordinary
scope of equity jurisdiction. If the plaintiff is disturbed in the
enjoyment of his incorporeal right, such disturbance is technically
a private nuisance. The complaint, after alleging that if the road
be permitted to be built and operated along the street and in
front" of plaintiff's house and land, he will be subject to a continuing nuisance, and to wrongs and injuries which will involve him in
interminable litigation, and for which damages will afford him no
appropriate or adequate relief, continues, "and he is informed and
believes the defendant is insolvent and unable to pay any judgment
for damages that might be recovered against it, and has mortgaged
its entire property for a sum far beyond its value, and that any
execution against it would be idle and fruitless." Where insolvency or want of ability to answer for injury to be done in the
party complained of be averred and proven, the court will grant an
injunction. The truth of the above allegations is admitted by the
demurrer.
VOL. 11=.-49
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It is claimed that the legislature have legalized this road, anti
therefore it is not a nuisance. It is admitted it is not a public
nuisance as it would be if the legislature had not legalized it.
The statutes effectually protect the company if it complies with the
conditions from an indictment, as against any interference with its
work, as a public nuisance, on account of the fee in the streets;
but not against claims for private damages arising from injuries to
.adjacent owners. The company may occupy the streets, but it
must occupy them at its peril in a way not directly or immediately
to injure private rights. In all the surface railroad cases we have
examined, while they have held that these roads do not operate as
a nuisance, they have clearly and, we think, unanimously decided
that the facts after investigation did not authorize a judicial deduction that a nuisance had been proven. In the case of Lexington
Ohio Railroad Co. v. Applegate, 8 Dana 289, cited by the defendant, the chief justice says, "neither the government of the city
nor of the state can license a private nuisance or take or encroach
on private property without the owner's consent or payment of his
damages."
No one will question the utility of the elevated railroad as a
public improvement of great convenience and accommodation to
the city and the public at large; but these accommodations cannot
authorize or justify its invasions on the rights of any portion of
our citizens. The individual whose property is affected because
the road is -f great public value, should be indemnified and fully
compensated by the public, or by the company which profits by
the improvement, for any loss or damage he has or may sustain.
WTe have seen, and it is admitted that the law has made provision
for such indemnity; that the surface railroads have been compelled
to pay the damages done to private property in every case where
it is proved to have been invaded. The defendant admits the
injury and wrongs done to the plaintiff as alleged in his comilaint
and its want of ability to make reparation.
We are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to relief, and
that the judgment should be reversed, with costs.

